




Towards Side-Channel Protected X25519 on 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4 Embedded Processors

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Utrecht, The Netherlands





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- cf. <https://safecurves.cr.yp.to/>

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- Adding more Side-Channel Protections to X25519
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- ARMing NaCl for Cortex-M4 processors: ChaCha20, Poly1305, ... but also ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD



Curve25519

Montgomery curves:

$$\mathcal{M}/\mathbb{F}_p := \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_p^2 : By^2 \equiv x^3 + Ax^2 + x \pmod{p}\}$$

Curve25519:

- $p = 2^{255} - 19$, $B = 1$



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Curve25519:

- $p = 2^{255} - 19$, $B = 1$, $A = 486662$, $(A + 2)/4 = 121666$.
- Used in many applications, OS, libraries, and protocols like OpenSSH, OpenBSD, Signal, NaCl, BoringSSL*, Tor*, ...
cf. <https://ianix.com/pub/curve25519-deployment.html>
- Included in RFC 7748, ...



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*Hybrid Post-Quantum Handshake X25519+NewHope:

- Boring SSL under the name CECPQ1 (Google Chrome Canary)
- Tor proposal under the name RebelAlliance



X25519

X25519 allows to compute a shared secret **K** between two parties (α, β) using Curve25519:

$$\alpha = (\textcolor{blue}{k_a}, \mathbf{P})$$

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Scalar multiplication: $\mathbf{Q} = [k] \cdot \mathbf{P} = \mathbf{P} + \mathbf{P} + \dots + \mathbf{P}$ in the group $(\mathcal{M}/\mathbb{F}_p \cup \mathcal{O}, +)$.



Montgomery Ladder Algorithm

Input: $k = (k_{m-1}, \dots, k_0)_2 \in \mathbb{N}$, $\mathbf{P} \in \mathcal{M}/\mathbb{F}_p$

Output: $\mathbf{Q} = [k] \cdot \mathbf{P} \in \mathcal{M}/\mathbb{F}_p$

$\mathbf{R}_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$; $\mathbf{R}_1 \leftarrow \mathbf{P}$

for $i \leftarrow (m - 1)$ **downto** 0 **do**

if $k_i == 0$ **then**

$\mathbf{R}_1 \leftarrow \mathbf{R}_0 + \mathbf{R}_1$

$\mathbf{R}_0 \leftarrow \mathbf{R}_0 + \mathbf{R}_0$

else

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end if

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return \mathbf{R}_0

(Point Addition)

(Point Doubling)

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- Homogeneous Projective Coordinates: $x \mapsto (X, Z)$ such that $x = X/Z$.
- Point addition in $3\mathbf{M} + 2\mathbf{S} + 6\mathbf{A}$, point doubling in $2\mathbf{M} + 2\mathbf{S} + 2\mathbf{A} + 1\mathbf{M}_{121666}$.



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- $X25519$ in $1287\mathbf{M} + 1274\mathbf{S} + 2040\mathbf{A} + 255\mathbf{M}_{121666}$ when inversion in \mathbb{F}_p takes $254\mathbf{S} + 11\mathbf{M}$.



ARM Cortex M4 Processors

- ARMv7E-M architecture
- 32-bit Thumb[®]-2 instruction set
- 3-stage pipeline
- 13 + 1 General-purpose registers
- Optional FPU Unit
- DSP Unit (32 × 32-bit Multiplier :-)
- 32-bit STM32F411RE MCU
- 100 MHz ARM Cortex-M4F
- 512-kB Flash
- 128-kB SRAM
- $I_0 = 100\mu\text{A}/\text{MHz}$




Figure : STMicroelectronics NUCLEO-F411RE



ARM Cortex M4 Instructions

Usual arithmetic instructions:

- ADD r_2, r_0, r_1 :

$$r_2 = r_0 + r_1$$



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
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ARM Cortex M4 Instructions

Powerful DSP instructions:

- UMULL r_2, r_3, r_0, r_1 :
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ARM Cortex M4 Instructions



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$$r_2 + r_3 2^{32} = r_0 r_1 + (r_2 + r_3 2^{32})$$







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
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- **UMLAL** r_2, r_3, r_0, r_1 :
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- **UMAAL** r_2, r_3, r_0, r_1 :
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





ARM Cortex M4 Instructions

Powerful DSP instructions:


- **UMULL** r_2, r_3, r_0, r_1 :
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- **UMLAL** r_2, r_3, r_0, r_1 :
 $r_2 + r_3 2^{32} = r_0 r_1 + (r_2 + r_3 2^{32})$



- **UMAAL** r_2, r_3, r_0, r_1 :
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No carry flags.



Representation of Integer Numbers and Modular Reduction

- 255-bit integers are represented in radix- 2^{32} using 8-limbs:

$$(a_0, \dots, a_7) \iff a = \sum_{i=0}^7 a_i 2^{32i}, \quad a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^{32}}$$



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 - ▶ Fit values into 256-bit
 - ▶ Aligned to the registers boundaries
- Full reduction modulo $p = 2^{255} - 19$ at the very end
 - ▶ Fit back values to the original field \mathbb{F}_p



Modular Addition/Subtraction

1. Straightforward addition with carry (8 AD?S instructions):

Input: $a = (a_0, \dots, a_7)$, $b = (b_0, \dots, b_7)$.

Output: $c = a + b = (c_0, \dots, c_7, \gamma_8)$

$\gamma_0 \leftarrow 0$

for $i \leftarrow 0$ **to** 7 **do**

$(c_i, \gamma_{i+1}) \leftarrow a_i + b_i + \gamma_i$

end for



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Input: $c = (c_0, \dots, c_7, \gamma_8)$

Output: $d \equiv c \bmod 2p$.

$(d_0, \gamma_1) \leftarrow c_0 + 38\gamma_8$

for $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** 7 **do**

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end for

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end for

$$d_0 \leftarrow d_0 + 38\gamma_8$$

Total: 106 cycles in 138 bytes.



256 × 256-bit Multiplication/Squaring

Subtractive Karatsuba:

$$\begin{aligned} ab &= (a_0 + a_1 2^{n/2})(b_0 + b_1 2^{n/2}) \\ &= a_0 b_0 + [(-1)^{(1-t)} |a_0 - a_1| |b_0 - b_1| + a_1 b_1 + a_0 b_0] 2^{n/2} + a_1 b_1 2^n \end{aligned}$$



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Costs:

- 3 multiplications
- 2 additions + 2 subtractions + some shifting
- 2 absolute differences and 1 conditional negation



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- 3-level subtractive Karatsuba $\implies 27 \times (32 \times 32)$ -bit multiplications



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Total: 546 cycles and 1,264 bytes.



64 × 64-bit Multiplication/Squaring

$$(a_0 + a_1 2^{32})(b_0 + b_1 2^{32}) = a_0 b_0 + (a_0 b_1 + a_1 b_0) 2^{32} + a_1 b_1 2^{64}$$



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Partial Products ($4 \times \text{UMULL}$):

$$(d_0, d_1) = a_0 b_0$$

$$(d_2, d_3) = a_0 b_1$$

$$(d_4, d_5) = a_1 b_0$$

$$(d_6, d_7) = a_1 b_1$$



64 × 64-bit Multiplication/Squaring

$$\begin{aligned}(a_0 + a_1 2^{32})(b_0 + b_1 2^{32}) &= a_0 b_0 + (a_0 b_1 + a_1 b_0) 2^{32} + a_1 b_1 2^{64} \\&= d_0 + (d_1 + d_2 + d_4) 2^{32} + (d_3 + d_5 + d_6) 2^{64} + d_7 2^{96}\end{aligned}$$

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
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
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Total: 10 instructions.

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$121666 \iff 0x0001db42 \iff 121666a_i < 2^{49}$



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First option:

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In total: 1UMULL + 7UMAAL + 1SUB = 9 instructions.



Implementation Results

\mathbb{Z}_{2^p} Arithmetic

Operation	Speed [Cycles]	Code [Bytes]	Stack [Bytes]
Addition	106	138	32
Subtraction	108	148	32

- GNU Compiler Collection for ARM Embedded Processors version 4.9.3 with -O2 -mthumb -mcpu=cortex-m4
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Implementation Results

Variable-base Single-scalar Multiplication

Platform	256 × 256-bit	256-bit	S/M	Curve25519	
	Multiply [Cycles]	Square [Cycles]	Ratio	[Cycles]	[Bytes]
8-bit	AVR ATmega [1]	6,868	—	22,791,580	—
	AVR ATmega [2]	7,555	5,666	20,153,658	—
	AVR ATmega [3]	4,961	3,324	13,900,397	17,710

[1] M. Hutter and P. Schwabe "NaCl on 8-Bit AVR Microcontrollers", AFRICACRYPT 2013.

[2] E. Nascimento et al. "Efficient and Secure Elliptic Curve Cryptography for 8-bit AVR Microcontrollers", SPACE 2015.

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16-bit	MSP430 [4]	3,606	—	1	9,139,739
	MSP430 [3]	3,193	2,426	0.76	7,933,296
	MSP430 [4]	2,488	—	1	6,513,011
	MSP430 [3]	2,079	1,563	0.75	5,301,792

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	MSP430 [3]	2,079	1,563 0.75	5,301,792	10,088
32-bit	ARM Cortex-M0 [3]	1,294	857 0.66	3,589,850	7,900
	ARM Cortex-M4 [5]	631	563 0.89	1,816,351	4,140
	ARM Cortex-M4 [This Work]	546	— 1	1,658,083	2,952
	ARM Cortex-M4 [This Work]	546	362 0.66	1,423,667	3,750

[1] M. Hutter and P. Schwabe "NaCl on 8-Bit AVR Microcontrollers", AFRICACRYPT 2013.

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
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[5] W. de Groot "A Performance Study of X25519 on Cortex M3 and M4", Master Thesis 2015.



Implementation Results


Area vs Speed





Implementation Results

Power/Energy vs Runtime



Adding more Side-Channel Protections to X25519

Randomized Projective Coordinates

$$x \mapsto (\lambda X, \lambda Z) \text{ for } \lambda \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}_{2^{255}-19}^*$$



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Costs:

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- Incl. cycles for setting up and generating 64-bytes randomness with ChaCha20



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Is this all? cf. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/923.pdf>



Towards Higher Security Levels

X448

Curve448 (RFC7748):

- $p = 2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1, B = 1, A = 156326.$

Preliminary results:



Towards Higher Security Levels

X448

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Preliminary results:

- 1-level additive Karatsuba



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- Reduced-radix 2^{28} with fast and lazy reduction



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$1,087/1,532$ cycles $\Rightarrow 1\text{S}=0.71\text{M}$.



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 $1,087/1,532$ cycles $\Rightarrow 1\text{S}=0.71\text{M}$.
- X448 @ 6,939,815 cycles $\approx 69\text{ms}@100\text{MHz}$

ARMing NaCl on Cortex-M4

ChaCha20 and Poly1305

NaCl:

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- Ed25519 @ ... in progress

IETF/TLS cipher suite as by RFC7905 and RFC7539:

- ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD @ 33.6 cycles/byte in 1,668 bytes ✓



Conclusion

High-speed and compact X25519 on ARM Cortex M4 processors

- High-speed full-radix field arithmetic
- Exploit powerful DSP multiplication instructions
- Promising results for high-speed IoT applications

Next steps:

1. Ultimate the porting of NaCl on ARM Cortex M4 processors
2. Validate Side-Channel Protections against actual measurements
3. Evaluate various efficiency-security trade-offs, e.g. X448/Ed448